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Note
Due Process and Prejudgment
Creditors' Remedies:
Sniadach' and Fuentes' Revisited
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
Two Supreme Court decisions, Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp.3 in 1969, and Fuentes v. Shevin4 in 1972, appeared to herald a
modern revolution in pre-judgment creditors' remedies: their mes-
sage-unless preceded by notice and an opportunity to be heard,
such remedies violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. For many observers, however, it appeared the revolu-
tion ended with the Court's decision in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.5
Petitioner Lawrence Mitchell bought a refrigerator, stove, stereo
and washing machine from respondent W. T. Grant in New Orleans.
In February, 1972, the store filed suit alleging an overdue and un-
paid balance on the purchase price of $547.17. The complaint
further alleged that the store had a vendor's lien on the goods6 and
asked that a writ of sequestration 7 be issued pending the outcome
of the suit. Pursuant to statute,8 the request for the writ contained
1. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
2. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
3. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
4. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
5. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). "Mitchell marks a substantial retreat from the
principles enunciated in Sniadach and Fuentes." Hobbs, Mitchell v. W.
Grant Co.: The 1974 Revised Edition of Consumer Due Process, 8
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 182 (1974).
6. Louisiana, a civil law state, does not recognize the validity of the com-
mon law conditional sales contract.
7. LA. CODE CIV. Pao. ANN. art. 3501 et seq. (West 1961). In Louisiana,
the sequestration statute is the functional equivalent of the common
law replevin procedure.
8. A writ of attachment or of sequestration shall issue only
when the nature of the claim and the amount thereof, if any,
and the grounds relied upon for the issuance of the writ
clearly appear from specific facts shown by the petition veri-
fied by, or by the separate affidavit of, the petitioner, his
counsel or agent.
The applicant shall furnish security as required by law
for the payment of the damages the defendant may sustain
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sworn affidavits that the facts alleged in the complaint were true,9
and that the store had reason to believe Mitchell would "encum-
ber, alienate, or otherwise dispose of the merchandise;"'1 also it was
accompanied by a security bond for twice the amount of the alleg-
edly unpaid balance. The Judge of the City Court of New Orleans
signed an order for the writ, and on February 5, 1972, with neither
prior notice to Mitchell, nor opportunity for him to be heard, a court
constable seized the goods. Thus, upon an ex parte "showing" of
statutory grounds, and the posting of bond, the store forced the
goods out of Mitchell's hands and into the custody of a court offi-
cial.
The Louisiana courts upheld the constitutionality of the seques-
tration statute against Mitchell's claims that it violated his right
to due process of the law." The United States Supreme Court
affirmed the validity of the ex parte procedure.
The Court's apparent disregard for the trend established in Sni-
adach and Fuentes disappointed those who expected that further
development in the area of pre-judgment remedies would be
couched in the language and rationale of those two cases. While
Sniadach and Fuentes prohibited summary deprivations of "signifi-
cant property interests,"'12 Mitchell reestablishes the more tradi-
when the writ is obtained wrongfully.
LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. art. 3501 (West 1961).
9. Id.
10. When one claims the ownership or right to possession of
property, or a mortgage, lien, or privilege thereon, he may
have the property seized under a writ of sequestration, if it is
within the power of the defendant to conceal, dispose of, or
waste the property or the revenues therefrom, or remove the
property from the parish, during the pendency of the action.
LA. CODE Crv. PRo. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1961).
11. In its decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court stressed both the debtor's
power over the goods in his possession and the fact that the conditional
sales contract contained a constitutionally valid waiver of right to a
pre-trial hearing. It would therefore seem that the Louisiana court
believed the facts of the Mitchell case brought it within the exceptions
to the rule of pre-seizure hearing allowed under the Fuentes decision.
See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 81. This decision has been criticized
in Comment, Fuentes v. Shevin: Its Treatment by Louisiana Courts
and Effect upon Louisiana Law, 47 TuL. L. REV. 806 (1973). The au-
thor notes that the danger to the creditors' goods is no greater under
sequestration statutes with pre-seizure notice and hearing than under
comparable replevin statutes with those constitutional safeguards. In
addition, the author concludes that the implied-in-law knowledge re-
lied on by the Louisiana court does not meet the standard for accept-
able waivers set forth in Fuentes. In fact, the Supreme Court ap-
proved the Louisiana statute for entirely different reasons than those
given by the state courts.
12. The importance of Sniadach and Fuentes lay in their recognition that
'"mere possessory rights" might merit constitutional protection. 395
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tional articulation, analysis, and resolution of problems stemming
from those interests.
Although not specifically repudiating the principle of Snia-
dach and Fuentes, that "mere possession and the right to use of
personal property constitute protected interests under the four-
teenth amendment,"'13 the Court in Mitchell nevertheless seems to
have retreated from Fuentes' focus on the rights and needs of the
debtor.
[Mitchell's] interest in the property, until the purchase price was
paid in full, was no greater than the surplus remaining, if any,
after foreclosure and sale of the property in the event of his de-
fault and satisfaction of outstanding claims .... The interest of
Grant, as seller of the property and holder of the vendor's lien,
was measured by the unpaid balance of the purchase price.14
By measuring the relative property interests in this way, an analy-
sis eschewed in Sniadach and Fuentes, the Court sets the stage for a
return in Mitchell to its traditional balancing test for determin-
ing the content of procedural due process. The abandonment of
Fuentes' strict rule allows a case by case approach while increasing
the chances that pre-hearing seizures will be approved.
The full import of Mitchell can only be appreciated by recalling
that Fuentes created a standard of "extraordinary situation" that
must be present to "justify postponing notice and opportunity for a
hearing."' 5 Although Justice Stewart enumerated three constitu-
tional cases' 6 in which the general rule could be relaxed, the
thrust of Fuentes was to circumscribe strictly the use of pre-
seizure hearings. Under Fuentes, the mere existence of a creditor's
ordinary security interest would not qualify as a "truly un-
usual situation." The rule of Fuentes reflected Justice Stewart's
belief that the dangers of mistaken and arbitrary deprivations of
property 17 in the consumer credit context outweighed the danger
U.S. at 342. See 407 U.S. at 86-87. The Mitchell Court questioned nei-
ther their lowered threshold determination nor the broadened scope of
constitutionally protectible interest that has developed in their wakes.
See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
13. 407 U.S. at 85.
14. 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974).
15. 407 U.S. at 90.
16. These were: (1) seizure must be directly necessary to secure an im-
portant governmental interest; (2) there must be specific need for
very prompt action; (3) the state must keep strict control over its
monopoly of force.
17. Justice White never takes issue with Justice Stewart on this point; it
is not clear, however, that the two men mean the same thing when
they refer to "mistake." Justice Stewart's dissent in Mitchell, as well
as his majority opinion in Fuentes, indicates that "mistaken and arbi-
trary deprivations of property" -include those cases in which the debtor
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of possible harm accruing to the goods while in the possession of
the debtor.
The rationale of Justice White's dissent in Fuentes formed the
foundation for his opinion in Mitchell: "[T]he creditor has a 'prop-
erty' interest as deserving of protection as that of the debtor."'18
According to Justice White's logic, due process guarantees a ra-
tional accomodation of these competing interests, an accommoda-
tion that can only be minimally standardized. At some point the
debtor must have an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the
claim, but that point lends itself neither to precise definition
nor to a rule demanding strict adherence. For Justice White, due
process consists in weighing the possible harm done to a debtor
through loss of the property pending trial against the state's inter-
ests in discouraging extra-judicial remedies and protecting the cred-
itor's security interest.19 Since Justice White believes that the im-
pact on the debtor of this deprivation is less than the possible
loss to the creditor, his due process naturally admits of ex parte
seizures in a wide variety of circumstances.
Despite the fundamental divergence between the two cases, Jus-
tice White declines to characterize Mitchell as overruling Fu-
entes. Instead, he distinguishes the cases in ways that empha-
size the accommodationist role of the state. Contending Mitchell
differs from Fuentes, Justice White points out that the Louisiana
statute0 allowed the debtor to "immediately have full hearing on
the matter of possession following the execution of the writ, thus
cutting to a bare minimum the time of creditor- or court-supervised
possession." 2 1 Thus Mitchell, far from holding that due process will
be satisfied by summary seizures, merely reiterates Justice White's
position that the fourteenth amendment requires pre-trial but not
necessarily pre-deprivation hearings.22 Although Mitchell permits
would be likely to prevail on the merits. Justice White views 'mis-
taken deprivations" as those instances where there was no default or
where no valid security interest exists in the property. If this is the
case, a much lower standard would protect debtors against "mistaken
deprivations" during pretrial hearings.
18. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 102 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
Compare Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974).
19. 416 U.S. at 607. The positions of both Justice Stewart and Justice
White probably stem from their differing beliefs concerning the ulti-
mate outcome of the average trial.
20. LA. CODE Civ. PRo. Ax i. art. 3506 (West 1961).
21. 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974). Justice White also noted with disapproval
that Mitchell did not avail himself of this right to a pre-trial, albeit
post-seizure, hearing. Mitchell's failure to move for dissolution of the
writ weakened his argument as far as Justice White was concerned re-
garding the severity of the deprivation he was forced to suffer as a re-
sult of the seizure.
22. See also Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). At least one state
210 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 54, NO. 1 (1975)
delaying the hearing, it stops short of declaring it unnecessary.
Whatever Justice White's intent in distinguishing the statutory pro-
cedures in Fuentes and Mitchell, the result will be to focus the con-
troversy on the content of the pre-trial hearing.
The Mitchell opinion contains many examples of Justice White's
search for significant factual differences between the two cases.
In Fuentes, the Court worried about the ability of creditors to re-
gain possession of the property through a purely ministerial act:
the pro forma approval of a pro forma allegation by a court clerk.
In the parish where Mitchell arose, practice dictated that a judge,
rather than a clerk of the court, receive application for the writ.
In addition, the writ had to be accompanied by supporting allega-
tions and documentation. The Court also distinguished Mitchell
from Fuentes based on the statutory requirements that creditors
must meet in order to force issuance of the writ. The Court
held the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes unconstitutional be-
cause they did not require the creditor to make a "convincing
showing" before the seizure that he was, indeed, entitled to the
property; the laws demanded no more than a "bare assertion of
the party seeking the writ that he is entitled to one. '23 Under the
Louisiana statute, however, the creditor is required to make specific
allegations of fact, supported by affidavits, that grounds exist for
issuing the writ. As a result of these "safeguards," Justice White
believed that Mitchell, unlike Fuentes, "was not at the unsuper-
vised mercy of the creditor and court functionaries. '24
Closer examination of the Louisiana procedure, however, dis-
closes very little extra protection for debtors. Although the Loui-
siana statute authorizes the writ "only when the nature of the
claim and the amount thereof, if any, and the grounds relied
upon for the issuance of the writ clearly appears from specific
facts shown by verified petition of affidavit," in practice the creditor
need show no more than was required under the statutes in Fu-
entes to seize the property. Under the Louisiana statute, grounds
for sequestration exist as long as the debtor has the power "to con-
court has already so interpreted the Mitchell holding. In Garcia v.
Krause, 380 F. Supp. 1254 (S.D. Tex. 1974), the court struck down the
Texas sequestration statute in part because it did not provide for an
immediate post-seizure, pre-trial hearing.
23. 407 U.S. at 74.
24. 416 U.S. at 616.
The approval of a writ of sequestration is not, as petitioner
contends a mere ministerial act. "Since a writ of sequestra-
tion issues without a hearing, specific facts as to the grounds
relied upon for issuance must be contained in the verified
petition in order that the issuing judge can properly evaluate
the grounds."
416 U.S, 016 n.12 (1974),
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ceal, dispose of or waste the property or the revenues therefrom,
or remove the property from the parish, during the pendency of
the action."25  To satisfy the requirements for issuing the writ,
therefore, the creditor need only allege that the debtor has the
property in his possession, since mere possession will always give
the debtor the "power" over the property that triggers the right
to sequestration. Thus, despite Justice White's explicit denial,26
the Louisiana procedure appears to operate in much the same way
as those struck down in Fuentes. The impression of similarity
is enchanced by the fact that the allegations supporting the request
for the writ in Mitchell were contained on a form affidavit which
required only that the creditor fill in the empty blanks.
Although in Mitchell, the court officer responsible for review-
ing the petitions and for issuing the writ in Orleans parish was a
judge, the Louisiana statute provides that the writ may be signed
by a clerk of the district court.27 In all other parishes in the state,
the clerk of the court is, in fact, the official involved in the proce-
dure. Given Justice White's reliance on the presence of the judge
to protect Mitchell from the "unsupervised mercy of the creditor
and the court functionaries," 28 the holding in Mitchell cannot
logically apply to any other parish in the state. The inquiry into
whether there is meaningful judicial supervision is central to the
problem; Justice White's approach, however, stresses form over sub-
stance by focusing on the title of the official who signed the writ
rather than on the sufficiency of proof required to support the alle-
gations contained in the affidavits.
No doubt part of the reason for Justice White's analysis lies in his
probable reluctance to overrule a case only two years old. In
addition, he was forced to piece his decision out of incomplete
cloth; neither counsel in the Mitchell case appears to have pre-
sented the Court with a precise factual explanation of the seques-
25. LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. art. 3571 (West 1960).
26. The dissenters, Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Douglas, disagreed
with Justice White, calling the procedure in Mitchell merely "pro
forma."
The Louisiana affidavit requirement can be met by any
plaintiff who fills in the blanks on the appropriate form
documents and presents the completed forms to the court.
Although the standardized form in this case called for some-
what more information than that required by the Florida and
Pennsylvania statutes challenged in Fuentes, such ex parte
allegations "are hardly a substitute for a prior hearing, for
they test no more than the strength of the applicant's own
belief in his rights."
416 U.S. at 632 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83 (1972).
27. LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. art. 282-3 (West 1960).
2a. 416 U.S. at 610,
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tration procedure.29 Thus, in the absence of any evidence to the
contrary, Justice White was free to indulge his pTesumption that
the allegations of danger to the property in the pro forma affida-
vits were true.30  Finally, Justice Stewart's failure in Fuentes to
define clearly the content of procedural due process allows Justice
White to substitute his own definition in Mitchell and reach
different results.
In Fuentes, Justice Stewart implied that the due process clause
guarantees an adversary hearing in which the creditor must show,
at a minimum, a right to pre-judgment relief and a prima facie case
on the merits. While Justice Stewart's meaning was not entirely
plain, he surely intended the pre-trial hearing to go further than a
showing of default.31 Indeed, at least two authors have concluded
that until Mitchell, Fuentes and the other cases considering due
process allowed "all issues [to] be raised at a hearing for prelimi-
nary relief which are permitted by the substantive law of the state.
In the consumer credit context, these issues will typically consist of
all possible personal defenses which justify non-payment as a mat-
ter of contract law.1
3 2
In Mitchell, however, Justice White reduces the content of the
hearing substantially from that envisioned either by the Fuentes
Court or by the commentators after Fuentes:
On the contrary, it seems apparent that the seller with his own
interest in the disputed merchandise would need to establish in
29. See Summary of Arguments Presented to the Court, Supreme Court
Proceedings, 42 U.S.L.W. 3345 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1973).
30. By the same token, of course, counsel's unfamiliarity with the facts
also allowed Justice Stewart to indulge the opposite presumption.
31. The opinion suggests that Mrs. Fuentes could have prevailed at the
hearing had she shown either (1) no unpaid balance owing; or (2)
other "valid" defenses. 407 U.S. at 87. And at the end, Justice Stewart
pointed out that hearings must determine the "validity, or at least the
probable validity, of the underlying claim ... ." Id. at 97.
32. Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes, and Beyond: Creditor Meets the
Constitution, 59 VA. L. Rnv. 355, 408 (1973). Soia Mentschikoff points
out that in many cases, the creditor's real injury may not give rise to a
valid defense to withholding payments or at best is severely limited
in ways that an unsophisticated purchaser would not likely know
about.
[Under the Code in cases of non-payment installment, the
debtor's right to continued use of the good s limited to sit-
uations where he has not elected the remedy of voiding the
debt as a result of fraud unconscionability or revocation of
acceptance for material breach of warranty. This defensecan, of course, only be asserted against the security party-seller and, in some jurisdictions, against his assignees.
Mentschikoff, Peaceful Repossession Under the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Constitutional and Economic Analysis, 14 WM. & MAn~Y L.
Blnv. 767 (1972-1973).
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any event only the probability that his case will succeed to war-
rant the bonded sequestration of the property pending outcome
of the suit. The issue at this stage of the proceedings concerns
possession pending trial and turns on the existence of the debt,
the lien, and the delinquency. 33
Justice White's narrowing of the scope of the hearing in Mitchell
should not surprise those familiar with his dissent in Fuentes.
Even there, he defined the hearing as an inquiry into "probable
cause for asserting that default has occurred." 34 Justice Stewart
refused to debate the point with him.35
The failure of the Fuentes Court to focus on the content of the
pre-trial hearing is symptomatic of the confusion surrounding the
definition of due process throughout the consumer credit field.30
In part, the confusion stems from the rapid growth of the concept
as the number of constitutionally protected property rights has in-
creased.37 While the Supreme Court has consistently taken the
position that the content of due process varies with the interest at
stake, there is an understandable tendency on the part of both
courts and commentators to generalize a holding in a particular
area to all others.38 Any attempt to define due process in the con-
text of consumer credit transactions must focus on both the content
and the ti'ming of the pre-trial hearing. At least three options
present themselves for consideration. The most superficial inquiry
would reach the existence of the debt, the lien, and the default.
33. 416 U.S. at 609 (citations omitted).
34. 407 U.S. at 102.
35. Justice Stewart's neglect of the difficult definitional problems led Jus-
tice White to conclude that Fuentes gave scant comfort to debtors.
The Court's rhetoric is seductive, but in the end analysis, the
result it reaches will have little impact and represents no
more than ideological tinkering with state law ... It is
very doubtful in my mind that such a hearing would in fact
result in protections for the debtor substantially different
from those the present law provide.
407 U.S. at 102-03.
36. As a measure of this confusion, defense counsel in Mitchell agreed to
a standard of probable cause saying, "I am willing to concede any
standard on prior hearing if you will just give me the hearing." 42
U.S.L.W. 3347 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1973). A hearing on these terms, as Jus-
tice White predicted in Fuentes, significantly increases the debtor's
protection.
37. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (employment); Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); Lindsey v. Nor-
met, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (tenant's rights).
38. This tendency is most marked in those advocates of reform through
due process who see it as the "great equalizer" of modern law and a
tool for social reform. From this point of view, due process should not
vary with the circumstances of each case but provide a constant quan-
tum of protection.
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Such a hearing would be purely factual and could occur either be-
fore or after seizure of the goods. Justice White supports this par-
ticular procedure. The second option includes a somewhat more
extensive factual inquiry into the reasons for disturbing the status
quo before the trial. The issue would be posed: Is there any proof
of danger to the creditor's legitimate security interest that necessi-
tates seizure of the goods pending trial on the merits. Such an
inquiry would, of course, precede seizure of the property. Finally,
a pre-trial hearing might provide the debtor with an opportunity to
preview his defenses to a trial on the merits.
The second option-the inquiry into reasons for disturbing the
status quo pending trial-appears to best accommodate the com-
peting interests of both, debtor and creditor. As noted, such a
hearing would necessarily precede any seizure of the goods. Thus,
for those who, like Justice Rehnquist, fear that pre-seizure notice
will afford debtors an opportunity for selling the property, the sec-
ond option is not a reasonable alternative. 9 One advantage of this
approach, however, lies in its recognition that resisting further pay-
ments is normally the only leverage a consumer debtor has;40 at the
same time, it acknowledges the creditor's legitimate concern for pre-
serving his security interest.
In the end, the alternative chosen will reflect the varying views
people have of the problems in the consumer credit industry. Crit-
ics of the present system point out that many consumers default, not
because they are unwilling or unable to pay, but because default is
often the consumer's most effective weapon in the battle against
victimization by easy credit merchants and computer error.41 Con-
sumer advocates thus look to the guarantees of due process as an-
other weapon in the arsenal. From this perspective, pre-seizure
notice and hearing is essential; and, at the hearing, the debtor should
be allowed to preview all his defenses relevant to the charge. For
those however, who along with Justice Rehnquist, perceive greater
danger in the ability of bad faith consumers to destroy or harm the
creditor's security interest, Mitchell's limited pre-trial possessory
hearing will be sufficient to fulfill the promise of the fourteenth
amendment.
42
39. Arguably, such notice does not encourage debtors to sell the property
any more than did the original default since every defaulting pur-
chaser realizes that some action will be instituted eventually.
40. See Eovaldi & Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The Mechanisms of
Redress, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 281-5 (1971).
41. Clark & Landers, supra note 32, at 407.
42. During oral argument before the Court in Mitchell, Justice Rehnquist
pointed out that "[n]otice and hearing also give an opportunity to
debtors to spirit chattels away. Experience with this type of practice
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It remains to be seen what Mitchell's effect will be in the area
of pre-judgment remedies.43 While the decision does not purport
to abandon the philosophy of Sniadach or Fuentes, it does indicate
that the decision to grant summary seizures must be made on a case
by case basis. Since Mitchell is based on an incomplete presenta-
tion of the facts, it is difficult to predict what the next creditor
will have to show in order to justify a pre-hearing seizure. Thus,
far from providing any guidelines for the lower courts, Mitchell
has injected a new element of uncertainty into the whole area.
Penny Berger '75
shows that the stuff disappears." 42 U.S.L.W. 3345 (U.S. Dec. 11
1973). See also Mentschikoff, supra note 32. Part of the problem in
identifying the evil has been the lack of a definitive study (or even
agreement on the methodology to be applied) on the impact of reform
on the price of credit.
43. The Court recently struck down a Georgia garnishment statute for
failing to provide an early hearing at which a creditor would have to
show probable cause, and because the garnishment order could be is-
sued by a court clerk without participation by a judge. Although the
decisions reach different results, both grounds for the Court's holding
were adumbrated in Mitchell. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 43 U.S.L.W. 4192 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1975).
